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In a cross-section of countries, state regulation of labor markets is strongly negatively correlated
with the quality of labor relations. In this paper, we argue that these facts reﬂect diﬀerent ways
to regulate labor markets, either through the state or through the civil society, depending on the
degree of cooperation in the economy. We rationalize these facts with a model of learning of the
quality of labor relations. Distrustful labor relations lead to low unionization and high demand
for direct state regulation of wages. In turn, state regulation crowds out the possibility for workers
to experiment negotiation and learn about the potential cooperative nature of labor relations.
This crowding out eﬀect can give rise to multiple equilibria: a “good” equilibrium characterized
by cooperative labor relations and high union density, leading to low state regulation; and a
“bad” equilibrium, characterized by distrustful labor relations, low union density and strong
state regulation of the minimum wage.
JEL Classiﬁcation: J30, J50, K00.
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Across OECD countries, there is a negative correlation between state regulation of wages and
the quality of labor relations. Figure 1 illustrates the negative cross-country correlation between
the stringency of minimum wage regulation and the quality of labor relations. The index of
state regulation of minimum wages combines information on the level of the wage ﬂoors, and
the existence of a legal statutory minimum wage along with the number of derogations from
the law, in 2000.1 The index of the quality of labor relations is constructed using the 1999
Global Competitiveness Reports, a survey sent out to thousands of executives with the following
question: “Do you think that labor/employer relations are generally cooperative”. Responses
may vary from 1 for strong disagreement to 7 for strong agreement. Figure 1 shows that
pessimistic beliefs in cooperation are associated with stringent regulation of wages at the country
level.2 Scandinavian countries display high quality of labor relations and low minimum wage
regulations, whereas a country like France shows low quality of labor relations and stringent
minimum wage regulations.
The high quality of labor relations observed in Nordic countries in the end of the 20th cen-
tury is striking to the extent that labor relations used to be conﬂi c t i n gi na l lO E C Dc o u n t r i e si n
the early 20th century, and especially in Nordic countries, as stressed by Crouch (1993). How-
ever, Crouch also argues that governments’ attitudes toward trade unions in Europe over the
19th century have had a major impact on the quality of labor relations one century later. More
precisely, countries where governments decided to settle labor conﬂicts by promoting direct ne-
gotiations between social partners are currently associated with better quality of labor relations.
In contrast, countries where the state substituted for direct negotiations between social partners
are now characterized by pessimistic beliefs in cooperation.
These facts raise the following question: starting from similar initial conditions, why did
some countries converge to the "Scandinavian" type situation with high trust in labor relations
and weak regulation of minimum wage, whereas other countries converged to the "French" type
situation with low trust and strong state regulation of minimum wage? In this paper, we argue
that historical (institutional or policy) accidents that inﬂuence beliefs in the quality of labor
relations provide an explanation for these diverging dynamics of labor markets institutions and
trust across countries.
In the ﬁrst part of the paper we provide evidence to the eﬀect that: (i) beliefs about the
1This index of state regulation of minimum wages and data on union density are presented more precisely in
section 2.
2The Global Competitiveness Reports is presented in section 2. The same pattern of correlation between
minimum wage regulation and the quality of labor relations holds when we focus on workers’ perception.
1quality of labor relations are history dependent: in particular, current beliefs are shaped by
past beliefs and past government attitudes towards social dialogue and organized labor; (ii) past
beliefs about the quality of labor relations aﬀect current demand for minimum wage regulation:
indeed, we document that current individual demand for wage regulation is positively correlated
with past pessimistic beliefs in cooperation and past state regulation of wages. Together, these
two ﬁndings suggest the possibility of multiple long-run equilibria, with some countries con-
verging toward a French equilibrium, whereas other countries converge toward a Scandinavian
equilibrium.
In the second part of the paper we develop a simple model to rationalize these ﬁndings. In this
model, by joining a trade union, workers can experiment on the ﬁrm’s willingness to cooperate.
Upon deciding whether or not to join the union and thereby engaging in such experimentation,
individuals do not necessarily know whether they operate in a cooperative environment. In other
words, the investment decision can be seen as a costly experimentation device aimed at ﬁnding
out more about the true cooperative nature of the economy. 3
In this framework, workers have less incentives to unionize and thereby pay the experimen-
tation cost when they can rely on state regulation rather than on union’s strength in order to
secure high wages (Checchi and Lucifora, 2002). Accordingly, the legal minimum wage reduces
workers’ incentives to learn about the scope for cooperation.4 The model thus predicts that a
more stringent legal minimum wage increases the probability that the economy will fall into a
low quality of labor relations trap. The model also accounts for the reverse impact of the quality
of labor relations on state regulation of the minimum wage. When beliefs in cooperation are
too pessimistic to motivate workers to join trade unions, there is a strong demand for direct
state regulation of minimum wage, which in turn results in a higher minimum wage being set
by the government in equilibrium. This interplay between state regulation and beliefs can lead
to multiple long—run equilibria, including a bad equilibrium with high minimum wage and a low
quality of labor relations. However, under suitable conditions on initial beliefs and the initial
minimum wage regulation, experimentation can succeed in making the country converge towards
the good equilibrium with low minimum wage and highly cooperative labor relations.
An additional prediction is that the joint dynamics of the legal minimum wage and of trust or
union density, is history-dependent. Namely, countries starting with low quality labor relations
3Our analysis draws on the distinction between voice rather than exit in labor relations, ﬁrst proposed by
Hirshman (1970) and then applied to trade unions by Freeman and Medoﬀ (1984). Namely, employees have
two alternative ways to respond if their relationship with the employer is not working: they can either exit the
relationship, or instead voice their discontent in an attempt to repair the relationship. Voice can help improve the
quality of the labor relation, but it involves a costly experimentation of the employer’s willingness to negotiate.
4The eﬀects of state regulation of minimum wages on distrust in labor relationships in our model are similar to
those identiﬁed by the political science literature on centralized rules that regulate civil society (Ostrom, 2005).
2will converge to a French equilibrium with higher probability than countries starting with high
quality of labor relations. However, a country starting with relative high quality of labor relations
may still fall in the "French trap" if random events occur which result in new labor conﬂicts
remaining unresolved.
Although our paper highlights new interactions between state regulation and the dynamics
of beliefs in cooperation, it builds on a whole literature on trust, beliefs and policy. First, our
view that the building-up of cooperation results from experimentation in collective negotiations,
is consistent with Putnam (1993)’s ﬁnding of a high degree of persistence in cooperative values
over time, a ﬁnding also conﬁrmed by Guiso et al. (2006, 2007a), Tabellini (2005) and Algan and
Cahuc (2006). Our analysis is somehow complementary to that proposed by Tabellini (2008),
who develops a model where parents rationally choose which values to transmit to their oﬀspring,
and this choice is in turn inﬂuenced by the external enforcement institutions. In Tabellini’s
framework, values evolve gradually over time and if the quality of external enforcement is chosen
by majority rule, there is hysteresis in the dynamics of values: namely, adverse initial conditions,
together with poor enforcement institutions, may lead to an equilibrium path where external
enforcement remains weak and individual values discourage cooperation.5 Our paper is also
closely related to a literature emphasizing the coevolution of policies and beliefs, along the lines
of Piketty (1995), Alesina and Angeletos (2005), Benabou and Tirole (2006) and Aghion et al.
(2009). In Piketty (1995), multiple equilibria in beliefs and redistributive policies can originate
from heterogeneous initial beliefs together with individuals’ inability to learn the true costs and
beneﬁts of redistribution. Benabou and Tirole (2006) suggest that agents can deliberately bias
their own perception of the truth. In Alesina and Angeletos (2005), the multiplicity of equilibria
originates in individuals’ preference for fair economic outcomes. Aghion et al. (2009) show how
regulation can interact with moral values within families. Francois and van Ypersele (2008) look
at the relationship between product market competition and cooperative values.
Our paper adds to these contributions in at least three respects. First, we explicitly analyze
the dynamics of beliefs and institutions, we derive the probability that this dynamics converges
to a good steady-state, and we perform comparative statics on this probability. Second, our
framework allows us to explain why individuals with pessimistic beliefs about the scope for
cooperation demand more state regulation on the labor market, and why this in turn deters
private investment in cooperation. Third, we illustrate these interactions by providing new
empirical facts on the interplay between past state regulation of minimum wages, dynamic
beliefs in the quality of labor relations, and future demand for regulation.
5See also Bisin and Verdier (2001), Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) and Guiso et al. (2007b) for alternative
formulation of transmission of beliefs and norms from parents to children.
3The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows the empirical relations between state
regulation of minimum wages, the quality of labor relations, and the demand for more minimum
wage regulations. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 concludes.
2 Facts about the quality of labor relations, union density and
minimum wage regulations
This section documents the cross-country heterogeneity in the quality of labor relations. We
show that this heterogeneity is associated with diﬀerent institutional designs. Countries with
distrustful labor relations are characterized by low union density and direct state regulation of
w a g e sb yl a w .I nc o n t r a s t ,c o u n t r i e sw i t ht r u s t f u l labor relations are associated with high union
density and minim wage setting rules decided within the civil society by collective agreement
between ﬁrms and unions. Finally, we analyze the dynamics of the quality of labor relations
and their links with minimum wage regulations. Let us begin to present the data that allow us
to shed light on these facts.
2.1 Data
Our cross-country analysis is based on 20 OECD countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States.
2.1.1 State regulation of minimum wage
We measure the stringency of state regulation of minimum wages through a composite index,
including both the legislation and the level of the wage ﬂoors.
The ﬁrst component of this index measures the stringency of the minimum wage legislation,
that is the extent to which the state directly regulates by law the labor market instead of
letting the civil society negotiate. This index includes two sub-indicators: i◦) minwage_legal
measures the existence of a legal statutory minimum wage, and if not, the degree of coverage of
the minimum wage set by collective bargaining; 2◦) minwage_dispersion measures the degree
of derogations in the minimum wage law, leading to dispersion in minimum wages across ages,
qualiﬁcations, regions, sectors or occupations. Data are borrowed from the International Labor
Organization (ILO), which provides detailed description of the diﬀerent legal procedures to set
minimum wages across countries. We scale each of these two indicators between zero and one,
a higher value indicating more stringent law enforcement. The indicators are fully described in
Appendix. We comment the values of these indicators below.
4Figure 2 shows the strong cross-country heterogeneity in the ﬁrst sub-indicator minwage_legal
over the period 1980-2003. A ﬁrst group of countries, namely Scandinavian countries, do not
have any legal minimum wage, and no legal automatic extension of the negotiated wage ﬂoors.
Wage ﬂoors are determined as part of the collective agreements between unions, and then they
apply to workers covered by these collective agreements only. A similar group of countries, made
up of Austria, Germany and Italy, do not have any legal statutory minimum wages. But legal
dispositions stipulate to what extent the negotiated wage ﬂoors should be extended to all other
workers. Lastly, a legal statutory minimum wage is implemented by most Mediterranean and
Anglo-Saxon countries. In the United States, this tradition dates back at least to the 1938 Fair
Act while it is more recent in United Kingdom which established a legal minimum wage in 1999.
Figure 3 shows that the same cross-country heterogeneity holds in the extent of derogation to
the minimum wage laws. Countries like France leaves no scope for derogations based on age,
occupation, or industry. Other countries allow for subminimum wages. Thus, special wage ﬂoors
extend up to age 24 in Sweden and to age 22 years in the Netherlands. The Netherlands accepts
a reduction up to 40 percent of standard minimum wage at 17 years old. Nordic countries let
unions negotiate the wage ﬂoor at the industry level, without any automatic extension to other
parts of the economy.
Henceforth, we measure the stringency of the overall minimum wage legislation using the
composite indicator minwage_legislation, obtained by multiplying the indicator of legal de-
termination of the minimum wage, minwage_legal, by the indicator of potential dispersion,
minwage_dispersion.
To get a comprehensive picture on state regulation of minimum wage, we combine the pre-
vious index on the stringency of the legislation, minwage_legislation, with an index on the level
of minimum wage. We measure the minimum wage level by the index minwage_level deﬁned
as the ratio of the minimum wage over the median wage in the economy. Minimum wage levels
are provided by the OECD database for all years since the mid-1970s. The OECD only reports
countries which have a legal statutory minimum wage. We thus complete these data by using
Neumark and Wascher (2004)’s indicators for other countries. These data cover two time peri-
ods, the late 1970s and the 2000s. The exact deﬁnition of the minimum wage variables used to
calculate the real value of national minimum wages.
The overall measure of minimum wage regulation used in the following tables and ﬁgures,
denoted by minwage, is simply the product minwage_legislation*minwage_level.
52.1.2 Union density and the quality of labor relations
We measure the perceived level of cooperation in the labor market by the quality of the relation
between workers and managers. We ﬁrst use the Global Competitiveness Reports,as u r v e y
sent out to thousands of executives each year across more than 50 countries. Among other
questions, executives are asked to respond to the following statement: “Labor/employer relations
are generally cooperative”. Responses may vary from 1 for strong disagreement to 7 for strong
agreement. One may of course worry about this only reﬂecting the perception of executives.
We thus use additional information from the International Social Survey program 1999 (ISSP),
which asks similar questions but for workers. The question is the following: “In all countries
there are diﬀerences or even conﬂicts between diﬀerent social groups. In your opinion, how much
conﬂict is there between management and workers in your country?” Responses are equal to 1
for “very strong conﬂict”, 2 for “strong conﬂict”, 3 for “not very strong conﬂict”, and 4 for “no
conﬂict at all”. We construct a variable equal to 1 if the respondent chooses answer 3 or answer
4, and zero otherwise, to capture the share of workers who believe in cooperative labor relations
in each country.
We measure workers’ involvement in unions by using the unionization data provided by the
OECD at a yearly frequency since the 1960s. We should be clear at this point that our primary
focus is on workers’ propensity to cooperate and to group into associations rather than rely
on state intervention to guarantee their wage. In this regard, union density appears to be a
more relevant indicator than union coverage rates. Obviously, the coverage indicator provides
information regarding the bargaining power of unions, and as a matter of fact the role of unions
in regulating wages becomes fairly high in some countries due to the automatic extension of
negotiated wages to all sectors, even if the union density rate is really low. However the coverage
indicator also captures the extent of state intervention in setting wages, since negotiated wages
are extended by law to the diﬀerent sectors of the economy. Thus this indicator does not
truly reﬂect workers’ preference for direct negotiations over the alternative of relying on state
intervention.
2.2 Cross-country correlation between the quality of labor relations, union
density and minimum wage regulations
Figure 1 illustrates the negative correlation between the stringency of minimum wage regulations
and executives’ beliefs in cooperative labor relations. The index of perceived cooperation on the
labor market is constructed using the 1999 Global Competitiveness Reports. Figure 4 shows
that the same correlation pattern holds when we look at the ISSP index of workers’ perceived
quality of labor relations. Figure 1, 4 and 5 show that Scandinavian countries are characterized
6by a low level of state intervention in the regulation of minimum wage. Wage ﬂoors are directly
negotiated between unions and no statutory legal minimum wage exists. This characteristic is
associated with highly cooperative labor relations. At the other extreme, state intervention is
high in countries (in particular, France) where labor relations are distrustful.
Another interesting fact about labor markets comes out of Figure 5. Indeed this ﬁgure re-
ports a strong positive correlation between the executives’ beliefs in cooperative labor relations
and union membership. This directly contradicts a common wisdom whereby anything that
strengthens employees’ bargaining power in ﬁrms, in particular higher rates of unionization,
should be negatively perceived by employers and therefore increase their distrust vis-a-vis work-
ers. Countries with low union density, such as France, are characterized by distrustful labor
relations, whereas Nordic countries with their high unionization rates show widespread beliefs
in cooperative labor relations.
Table 1 presents the results of the associated OLS regression. Column 1 reports the positive
correlation between the quality of labor relation and union density in 2000. We measure the
degree of cooperation by the GCR index which provides more observations, even if the correlation
pattern is lower than that obtained with the ISSP index. Column 1 shows that the R2 is 0.34,
and union density is statistically signiﬁcant at the one percent level. The second column shows
that the correlation between the quality of labor relation and union density remains statistically
signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level when one controls for the unemployment rate and traditional
labor market institutions taken from Nickell et al. (2001). Columns 3 and 4 report the strong
negative correlation between the GCR index of the quality of labor relation and our index of state
regulation of the minimum wage in the 2000s. The negative correlation is highly statistically
signiﬁcant at the one percent level even when one controls for the unemployment rate and other
labor market institutions in Column 4, none of which appear to be statistically signiﬁcant.
Table 2 shows that these multiple equilibria in beliefs are associated with diﬀerent ways of
regulating labor markets: either by strong state regulation or through social dialogue. Column
(1) reports the cross-country estimated correlation between unionization rates and the extent
of state regulation of minimum wage over the three period 1980, 1990 and 2003. The sample
is unbalanced, with fewer 2 observations for the period 1980. This correlation is negative, and
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. Almost 45 percent of the cross-country variation
observed in the state regulation index is associated with diﬀerences in unionization rates.
Table 2 - Column (2) reports the within correlation between contemporaneous values of
unionization rate and state regulation of minimum wage. To allow for enough time variation
between periods, we focus on the evolution of attitudes between the two sub-periods 1980s and
2000s. A strong negative correlation shows up, the eﬀect being statistically signiﬁcant at the one
7percent level. Table 2 - Column (3) reports the correlation between the index of state regulation
of minimum wage and the lagged value of union density. When looking at state regulation in
the early 1980’s, we use union density in the early 1970s (1970-74). The estimated coeﬃcient
is strongly negative and statistically signiﬁcant at one percent level. Lower unions rates during
the 70’s are associated with more stringent minimum wage regulation by the state a decade or
two later. This result might account for the rising political support in favor of an increase in
statutory minimum wages in countries where the bargaining power of unions is declining. A
striking example is the United Kingdom where wage ﬂoors used to be set by unions before the
country embraced a statutory minimum wage in 1999 to oﬀset the decline of union bargaining
power. What happened is that the unionization rate had fallen from 50 % in 1980 to less than
30% in the late 1990’s, in part as a result of Margaret Thatcher’s crackdown on strikes in 1982.
Meanwhile, the political pressure from the workers to get a legal minimum wage has gained
momentum, leading Tony Blair to introduce a statutory minimum wage.
2.3 History dependence and the demand for labor market regulation
Now we move from looking at aggregate cross-country data to looking directly at individual
beliefs in cooperation and individual demand for regulation. We document the fact that beliefs
in the quality of labor relations are strongly history-dependent and shaped by past regulation
of the labor market. We then show that these beliefs aﬀects the current demand for regulation.
2.3.1 History-dependence of beliefs in cooperation
To analyze the history-dependence of beliefs, we focus on the attitudes of US-born immigrants.
We look at the correlation between their beliefs in the quality of labor relations and the features
of their country of origin likely to shape their beliefs. We use the General Social Survey which
provides information on both attitudes towards the quality of labor relations and the country
of origin of the ancestors. The GSS covers the period 1972-2004 and provides information on
the birth place and the country of origin of the respondent’s forebears since 1977. The GSS
variable for the country of origin reads as follows: “From what countries or part of the world
did your ancestors come?”. Origins cover nearly all European countries. We focus on US-born
immigrants and select country of origins with at least 10 observations.6 Beliefs in cooperative
labor relations of US immigrants are measured by two main questions. The ﬁrst one reads
:“ T h e r ew i l la l w a y sb ec o n ﬂict between management and workers because they are really on
6This leaves us with a a maximum of 16 country of origins depending on the GSS question: Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and United Kingdom
8opposite sides”. The answers ranges from 1: “Strongly agree”, 2: “Agree”, 3: “Disagree”, 4:
“Strongly disagree”. We order the answers to provide an index of Distrustful labor relations.
The second question, more general, deals with the level of conﬁdence in business: “Would you
say you have a great deal of conﬁdence, only some conﬁdence, or hardly any conﬁdence at all in
companies?”. The answers range from 1: “A great deal”, 2: “Only some” to 3: “Hardly any”.
This question provides an index of Distrust in companies
Figure 6 shows the correlation between beliefs in cooperation of US-immigrants and the qual-
ity of labor relations in the home country. We measure the conditional average of US-immigrants’
beliefs by running individual ordered probit regressions controlling for age, education, employ-
ment status (inactive, employed, unemployed), gender, level of income (expressed in brackets
between 1 and 12 in the GSS database) and country of origin ﬁxed eﬀects. Denmark is consid-
ered as the reference country of origin. Standard errors are clustered at the country of origin
level. There is a substantial heterogeneity in the beliefs in cooperative labor relations depend-
ing on the country of origin. Relative to US-immigrants with Danish origins, immigrants from
Africa, Latin America, Mediterranean countries and most Eastern European countries have a
much higher level of distrust in cooperative labor relations. The gap in distrust is lower among
immigrants form other Nordic countries and from UK or Austria. These beliefs are fairly persis-
tent. All the coeﬃcients associated with the country of origins are statistically signiﬁcant at the
1 percent level (not reported here). Besides these beliefs are strongly correlated with the quality
of labor relations in the home country. Between 40 percent and 50 percent of the heterogeneity
in US-immigrants’ beliefs is associated with diﬀerences in the quality of labor relations in the
home country.
Table 3 - Row I reports the corresponding ordered probit estimates when we replace the
country of origin dummies by the index of the quality of labor relations in the source country.
We still control for age, education, employment status, gender and the level of income. Standard
errors are clustered at the country of origin level. The correlation between US-immigrant beliefs
in the quality of labor relations of the US-born immigrants and the quality of labor relations
in the home country is statistically signiﬁcant at the one percent. This correlations suggests a
strong inertia of beliefs, inﬂuenced by a common history.
2.3.2 The eﬀect of past state regulation on the dynamics of beliefs in cooperation
What explains the heterogeneity in beliefs in the quality of labor relations? One main expla-
nation, put forward by Crouch (1993), is that current beliefs in the quality of labor relations
have been shaped by past labor market regulation and by past success or failure in negotiations
between social partners. Since minimum wage legislation might be too recent to be related to
9the attitudes of US-born immigrants, here we focus on Crouch’s broader historical variables on
state regulation and industrial relations.7 Crouch links the evolution of trust in labor relation-
ships across countries to governments’ attitudes toward unions or towards using labor market
regulations when facing labor disputes in the late 19th century and early 20th century.
Crouch’s ﬁrst key ﬁnding is that the quality of labor relations is not given by nature. Instead
it is largely shaped by the success or failure of negotiations between unions and ﬁrms in the past.
Thus Nordic countries, with currently high levels of trust between employers and employees, used
to experience very tense labor relations: in particular, Crouch stressed that labor relations were
fairly hostile in Denmark in the late 19th century, with the Great Lock-Out of 1898 probably
being the single biggest industrial dispute in Europe by that time. However, this dispute led to
a social pact between organized labor and ﬁrms, whereby unions would accept private property
of ﬁrms by capitalists, and in exchange, capitalists and workers unions would negotiate wages
directly without any state intervention. Ever since, the unionization rate has steadily risen in
Denmark and this country displays one of the highest quality of labor relation in the 2000s. The
same picture holds for Belgium, Austria, Germany, United Kingdom and Sweden. According
to Crouch, labor relations in these countries used to be highly conﬂicting. But precisely this
encouraged employers and the state to design institutions aimed at involving unions in order
to contain social disruption. This evolution pattern departs from that of France where central
governments, whether from the right or from the left, have remained traditionally suspicious vis-
a-vis unions and instead have privileged centralized negotiations led by the government itself,
for example during the Front Populaire in 1936 or more recently with the Grenelles Agreement
in the aftermath of May 1968.
Crouch’s second ﬁnding is that previous success or failure in labor negotiations are largely
associated with past governments’ attitude towards organized labor and to its propensity to di-
rectly regulate labor markets. Crouch classiﬁes countries in three categories. The ﬁrst category
includes countries that were most hostile to the development of unions and consequently most
prone to regulate labor markets and settle labor disputes through centralized decisions. This
group includes the main catholic strongholds in Europe, namely France, Italy, Spain and Por-
tugal. Crouch accounts for this fact by stressing that in these countries the central government
needed to assert its authority over the Catholic church and to confront all forms of organized in-
terests, including worker organizations. The second category comprises ﬁve countries where the
state was rather neutral vis-a-vis labor organization and would consequently let them directly
with ﬁrms. This is the case of Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, UK and Ireland.
7Blanchard and Philippon (2006) show that these past government attitudes toward unions may also explain
current unemployment rates.
10Finally, the third category consists of countries where the State would encourage union involve-
ment in the regulation of labor markets. This category includes Austria, Germany, Netherlands,
Switzerland. In particular, the Austrian and German governments were ﬁrst to set up elected
workers commissions to run pensions and social insurance schemes as of the 1880s.
Table 3 - Row II provides quantitative evidence on the eﬀect of past state regulation on the
current trust between social partners. More speciﬁcally, we run the same micro estimates on
the beliefs in cooperative labor relationships of US-immigrants, but we replace the country of
origin dummies by dummies that reﬂect the state’s attitude towards organized labor and social
dialogue in the country of origin. The hostile states category is taken as the reference. Table 3 -
Row II shows that the probability to distrust companies, or to think that managers and workers
will always be in conﬂict, decreases when US-immigrants come from a country with neutral
or supportive attitudes vis-a-vis unions. Relative to hostile states, the eﬀect is statistically
signiﬁcant at the one (ten) percent when individuals come from a country which used to have
supportive (neutral) attitude toward unions at the end of the 19th century.
2.3.3 Beliefs in cooperation and the demand for regulation
Here, we document how individuals’ past beliefs in cooperative labor relations and how past
regulations in the country of origin, shape current political support for regulation of the labor
market. More speciﬁcally, we analyze the demand for wage regulation by US-immigrants with
the question: “Here are some things the government might do for the economy. Please show
which actions you are in favor of and which you are against: control wages by law?”. The
answers ranges from 1, for strongly disagree, to 5 for strongly agree.
Table 4 - Column (1) reports the correlation between the demand for wage regulation from
US-immigrants and their beliefs in cooperative labor relations, as measured by their level of
conﬁdence in business. We run ordered probit regression controlling for the same set of indi-
vidual controls as before and for country of origin ﬁxed eﬀects. Column (1) shows that the
propensity to call for wage regulation by law decreases with the level of conﬁdence in business,
the eﬀect being statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. Table 4 - Columns (2) reports the
correlation between the probability for US-immigrants to call for a state regulation of wages and
the indicator of labor quality in the source country. The correlation is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
Table 4 - Columns (3) - (4) report the correlation between the demand for regulation of
US-immigrants and quantitative indicators of contemporaneous wage regulation in the home
country. Column (3) reports the correlation with the stringency of state regulation of minimum
wage in the home country, based on our synthetic index presented in section 2. The relations
11is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. In contrast, Column (4) shows a
negative correlation between the demand for wage regulation and union density in the home
country, averaged over the period 1960-2000.
Table 4 - Columns (5) documents the impact of past state attitudes towards organized labor
and social dialogue in the home country, drawing on Crouch’s classiﬁcation. Countries of origins
in the hostile category are taken as the reference group. Respondent coming from country of
origin in the supportive or neutral category, are more likely to believe that it is not the role of
the state to regulate wages. The eﬀect is statistically highly signiﬁcant. Interestingly, the eﬀect
is even more signiﬁcant for respondents from a country of origin in the neutral category. This
is consistent with the fact that in these countries the state was much less interventionist in the
process of building-up organized labor and collective negotiations.
3 The model
We have provided evidence to the eﬀect that: (i) past minimum wage regulation and past beliefs
on the quality of labor relations aﬀect current beliefs; (ii) current beliefs on the quality of labor
r e l a t i o n si nt u r na ﬀect future demand for minimum wage regulation. In this section we develop
a simple model that rationalizes these empirical ﬁndings and that shows how they can explain
the diverging dynamic paths of the quality of labor relations and minimum wage legislations
across countries.
3.1 Basic framework
We consider an inﬁnite horizon model of an economy populated by a unit continuous mass of
risk neutral individuals, each of whom lives for one period. There are two non storable goods
in the economy: a numeraire good and labor. Each individual is endowed with one unit of
labor. Individuals get utility from their consumption of the numeraire good and they diﬀer in
productive ability. In each period t, the proportion of individuals who produce less than y, y ≥ 0,
with one unit of labor, is deﬁned by the cumulative distribution function G(y). For simplicity,
we shall take the G distribution to be uniform on the interval [0,1].
Individuals may decide to join a trade union. The utility of an individual paid wage wt in
period t, is just equal to wt if the individual is not unionized and to
vt = wt(1 − c)
if she is unionized. The parameter c ∈ (0,1) is introduced to represent the cost of unionization,
equal to cwt. The assumption that the cost of unionization is proportional to the wage has many
12empirical justiﬁcations. In most countries, the cost of membership is a fraction of the wage.
The opportunity cost of the time that workers devote to union activity increases with their
wage. Employers may also slow the career of union members. For the employee, the cost of this
behavior of the employer should increase with the wage.
Workers face a monopsonistic representative ﬁrm. This assumption is made for simplicity.
It is the simplest way to represent monopsonistic labor markets, where workers are paid below
their marginal productivity. This property can be derived from many models, in particular
from the standard search and matching model which shows that search and matching cost
induce wages below marginal productivity (see e.g. Pissarides, 2000). In our framework, the
monopsonistic ﬁrm makes take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to non unionized workers. Consequently, non
unionized workers cannot get more than the minimum wage ¯ wt ≥ 0 set by the government if
their productivity y is higher than the minimum wage, and they get no job oﬀer from the ﬁrm
otherwise.
Unionization induces collective bargaining over wages and over other dimensions of labor
relations. Following Hirschman (1970) and Freeman and Medoﬀ (1984) we consider that unionism
provides a “voice” which can improve productivity. Namely, the production of the workers
increases from y in the absence of trade union to (1+λ)y, λ > 0, when the workers are unionized
and when voice succeeds. But voice can also fail. In that case, productivity is not improved by
unionization. We assume that the probability that voice succeeds depends on the quality of labor
relations, which can be either “high” or “low”. The quality of labor relations is not observable.
Workers only observe whether voice succeeds or fails.8 In every period, voice can either be: (i) a
success, in which case the productivity of all type-y unionized workers is increased by a factor
(1 + λ), (ii) or a failure, in which case productivity is not increased by trade unions. More
precisely, in each period t, the probability that voice succeeds or fails is:
Pr(voice succeeds) =
½
1 − ε if quality of labor relations is high
ε if quality of labor relations is low
Pr(voice fails) =
½
1 − ε if quality of labor relations is low
ε if quality of labor relations is high
where ε<1/2.9
8For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that workers are able to extract the same information independently
of the number of employees whose wage is bargained over by the trade union. Alternatively, one could assume
that workers observe the outcome of negotiation with a probability that increases with the number of employees
whose wage is bargained over in the period. Our results are robust to introducing this additional feature to the
model.
9That “voice” does not succeed with probability one if the quality of labor relation is high, reﬂects the fact
that the quality of labor relation is not perfect. That it may succeed with positive probability ε when the quality
of labor relation is low, reﬂects the fact that workers may sometime overcome the non-cooperative nature of the
employer and still manage to strike a good deal.
13Unionization also provides bargaining power to workers. Unionized workers can negotiate
their wage once they observe whether voice has succeeded. They get a share β ∈ (0,1] of the
surplus that they generate. If a wage agreement is not reached, workers are paid the minimum
wage and voice does not work any more. Accordingly, when voice succeeds, the ﬁrm gets proﬁts
p e rw o r k e re q u a lt oy(1 + λ) − wt if an agreement is reached, and y − ¯ wt i nt h eo p p o s i t ec a s e .
Workers get wt(1−c) if wage negotiation succeeds and ¯ wt(1−c) if it fails. Surplus sharing yields
the wage10
wt(y)= ¯ wt + μy,
where μ = βλ/[1−c(1−β)] > 0. It turns out that the negotiated wage is equal to the minimum
wage plus a share of the increase in productivity generated by voice when voice succeeds. When
voice fails, wage bargaining yields the minimum wage ¯ wt because unionization does not generate
any positive surplus.
The dynamics of beliefs
Upon deciding whether or not to unionize and thereby learn on the quality of labor relations,
workers do not know whether they live in a cooperative economy where such learning will indeed
lead to high quality of labor relations or if they live in a non-cooperative economy where learning
is pointless. In other words, joining a union can be seen as a costly experimentation to improve
labor relations and discover the true cooperative nature of the economy.
Let e ∈ {C,N} denote the type of the economy: C if the economy is cooperative and N if it
is non cooperative. We let
Pr
t=0
(e = C)=q0
denote workers’ prior beliefs as to the cooperative nature of the economy at date zero.
Ah i s t o r yht(n,s) at the beginning of period t consists in n ≤ t past negotiations (between
date 0 and date t − 1), s ≤ n of which have been successful, and n − s have been unsuccessful.
The number n of periods with negotiation, may be smaller than t since there is no negotiation
in the periods where nobody is unionized.
>From Bayes’ rule, the probability that the economy is cooperative in period t is:
qt =P r[ e = C|ht(n,s)] =
(1 − ε)sεn−sq0
(1 − ε)sεn−sq0 +( 1− ε)n−sεs(1 − q0)
. (1)
Finally, using the fact that Pr[e = C|ht(n,s)] = 1 − Pr[e = N|ht(n,s)], we can compute
the probability that voice succeeds in period twhen there have been n previous periods with
10Note that the wages negotiated by the trade union depend upon workers’ productivity, whereas the minimum
wage is independent of productivity. Here we simply capture the idea that trade unions have a better information
about workers’ productivity than the government.
14negotiations, s of which have been successful, namely:
p(qt)=ε +( 1− 2ε)qt. (2)
In this framework, by unionizing, workers manage both to obtain wage increases and also to
generate information about the possibility to increase the quality of labor relations. In periods
in which some workers are unionized, the outcome of the negotiation reveals information on the
type of economy. This in turn enables workers of the future generation to update their beliefs.
When nobody is unionized in period t, workers of generation t +1cannot update their beliefs.
Bayes’ rule immediately implies a positive correlation between beliefs in successive periods
as stated by:
Lemma 1: The belief p(qt) that bargaining succeeds in period t is non-decreasing with p(qt−1).
Proof: From the deﬁnition (2) of beliefs we know that p(qt,I) increases with qt =P r[ e = C|ht(n,s)].
Let
a =P r[ e = C|ht(n,s)];b =P r
£
e = C|ht−1(n0,s 0)
¤
where n0 = n, or n0 = n − 1, and s0 = s or s0 = s − 1.We have:
1/a =1 + (
1 − q0
q0
)(
1 − ε
ε
)n−2s;
1/b =1 + (
1 − q0
q0
)(
1 − ε
ε
)n0−2s0
.
Thus
1/a =( 1 /b)
µ
1 − ε
ε
¶n−n0−2(s−s0)
+1−
µ
1 − ε
ε
¶n−n0−2(s−s0)
.
In particular (1/a) and (1/b) are positively correlated, and thus so are a and b. QED.
Timing
At the beginning of period t =0 , nature determines once for all the type of economy e ∈
{C,N} which is not observable. Then, in each period t ≥ 0, the sequence of decisions can be
described as follows:
1. Individuals vote to elect a government that sets a minimum wage ¯ wt ≥ 0.
2. Workers decide whether or not to join the trade union.
3. Wages are set by employers for non unionized workers and by wage negotiation for union-
ized workers.
15We ﬁrst analyze the outcome of the wage negotiation and the decision to unionize when
the minimum wage is exogenous. This ﬁrst step will allow us to shed light on the eﬀect of the
minimum wage on the dynamics of beliefs. Then, we endogeneize the minimum wage by making
it a choice variable by the elected government.
3.2 The eﬀect of minimum wage on the dynamics of beliefs
Unionization behavior is inﬂuenced by beliefs about the cooperative nature of labor relations
and by the minimum wage regulation. Beliefs are themselves inﬂuenced by past unionization
experience. In this section, we ﬁrst analyze how the minimum wage inﬂuences unionization
within each period t, taking beliefs are given. Then, we proceed to analyze the impact of the
minimum wage on the dynamics of beliefs and unionization.
3.2.1 Short run equilibrium
Here we analyze workers’ decisions to unionize within any period t, with given belief qt =
Pr[e = C|ht(n,s)] and given minimum wage ¯ wt. All workers whose productivity is lower than
the minimum wage ¯ wt are unemployed. Non unionized workers with productivity y ≥ ¯ wt obtain
the minimum wage ¯ wt ≥ 0. Unionized workers with productivity y ≥ ¯ wt expect to get the wage
wt(y)=μy +¯ wt with probability p(qt) and the minimum wage with probability 1 − p(qt).
Unionization decision
Workers decide to join unions in period t if and only if the utility derived from union mem-
bership, equal to {p(qt)wt(y)+[ 1− p(qt)] ¯ wt}(1−c), is larger than the utility obtained without
union membership, equal to the minimum wage ¯ wt.11 Therefore, all workers whose productivity
lies above the threshold
ˆ yt =
c ¯ wt
μ(1 − c)p(qt)
(3)
decide to become union member. The share of workers who decide to join a union in period t is
therefore equal to:
πt =1− G
µ
c ¯ wt
μ(1 − c)p(qt)
¶
. (4)
In particular the share of unionized workers decreases with the minimum wage, the reason
simply being that the gains from unionization are lower when the minimum wage is higher. More
pessimistic beliefs about the chance of success of bargaining also lead to lower union density.
11Note that the decision to join the trade union is motivated here by individual gains only and not by social
custom as in the approach developed by Akerlof (1980), Booth (1985), Booth and Chatterji (1993), Corneo (1995),
Naylor (1989) and Naylor and Crips (1993) and Naylor and Raaum (1993).
16In particular, πt =0and therefore there will be no workers’ experimentation on the scope for
cooperation, whenever
qt < qt = p−1(
c ¯ wt
μ(1 − c)
).
3.2.2 The dynamics of beliefs, unionization and experimentation
We now proceed to analyze the dynamics of beliefs and unionization when the minimum wage
is exogenously ﬁxed at some level w, for all periods t ≥ 0. There are potentially two possible
steady states:
i) A steady state where π>0,
ii) A steady state where π =0 .
If
q0 < ¯ q = qt = p−1(
c ¯ w
μ(1 − c)
),
then economy reaches its steady state immediately since beliefs are never revised thereafter.
Now suppose that
q0 > ¯ q.
and that the minimum wage is suﬃciently low that experimentation occurs in period t =0 .
In this case, the dynamics of experimentation may lead the economy to converge towards a
steady state with positive union density. However, such optimistic beliefs in period zero are not
suﬃcient to insure that the steady state with positive union density will indeed be reached.
More speciﬁcally, when q0 > ¯ q, the economy converges toward such steady state with a
positive probability, which will be shown below to depend both upon the minimum wage ¯ w and
upon q0.We now show that the economy converges toward such steady state with a positive
probability, which will be shown below to depend both upon the minimum wage ¯ w and upon q0.
Note ﬁrst that if negotiation succeeds in period zero, then we must have:
q1 >q 0.
T h es a m er i s ei nw o r k e r s ’o p t i m i s mo c c u r sb e t w e e np e r i o d st and t+1when negotiation succeeds
in period t. The dynamics of beliefs is fully described by:
qt+1 =
½ (1−ε)qt
(1−ε)qt+ε(1−qt) >q t with probability 1 − ε
εqt
εqt+(1−ε)(1−qt) <q t with probability ε
(5)
if the economy is type-C,a n d
qt+1 =
½ (1−ε)qt
(1−ε)qt+ε(1−qt) >q t with probability ε
εqt
εqt+(1−ε)(1−qt) <q t with probability 1 − ε
(6)
17if the economy is type-N.
A ﬁrst implication of the updating equation (5) is that as the experimentation history ex-
pands, the reference type ends up being learned with probability 1. More formally, the contin-
uous mapping theorem (see Acemoglu et al, 2007) implies that s → (1 − ε)t as t →∞when
experimentation occurred in all periods 0,1,...,t− 1,w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e st h a t
lim
t−→∞
Pr[e = C|ht(t,s)] = lim
t−→∞
q0
q0 +( ε
1−ε)t(1−2ε)(1 − q0)
=1 .
However, as we shall see below, experimentation may not occur in all periods even when the
economy is cooperative (e = C). And as a result the economy will not avoid falling into a no
experimentation trap with probability one. The continuous mapping theorem also yields that
limt−→∞ Pr[e = C|ht(t,s)] = 0 if e = N, which this time will imply that with probability one
the economy falls into a no experimentation trap. From now on we shall concentrate on the case
where the economy is truly cooperative (type-C).
A second implication of the updating equation (5), is that the probability of uninterrupted
experimentation (and therefore of convergence toward full learning) increases with the value of
the initial beliefs q0. For example, if q0 is larger than the threshold value ¯ q below which there is
unionization, but close enough to ¯ q, the probability that there unio n i z a t i o ni np e r i o dz e r o ,b u t
then no unionization in subsequent periods, can be high. To see this, imagine that q0 > ¯ q but
that negotiation fails in period zero (this occurs with probability ε). Then, equation (5) implies
that q1 <q 0. If q1 is smaller than ¯ q, which will occur if q0 is close enough to ¯ q, unionization
i se q u a lt oz e r oi np e r i o do n e .I nt h a tc a s e ,t h ee c o n o m yf a l l si nan o - e x p e r i m e n t a t i o nt r a pi n
period 1, after one period of experimentation, and from period zero this case is perceived to
occur with probability ε.
For higher values of q0 it will take more than one failure to bring the economy to a no-
experimentation trap. Such a scenario can occur after period 1 when there are successive failures
f o rh i g h e rv a l u e so fq0. More precisely, we can show:
Proposition 1: If the economy is of the cooperative type (e = C) and if q0 > ¯ q, then the
economy avoids the no-experimentation trap with probability Q(q0,w) which is increasing in q0
and decreasing in w.
Proof: Let T(q0, ¯ q) be deﬁned by
ϕ(T,qo)=¯ q,
where:
ϕ(T,qo)=
1
1+(
1−q0
q0 )(1−ε
ε )T .
18Since ϕ is decreasing in T and increasing in q0, then T(q0, ¯ q) is increasing in q0 and decreasing
in ¯ q.
Now the ex ante expected probability that qt will eventually fall below ¯ q, which in turn will
lead to a no-experimentation trap, is equal to:12
¯ P(q0, ¯ q)=
P
n≥0
P
s≤
n−T(q0,¯ q)
2
¡n
s
¢
(1 − ε)sεn−s
P
n≥0
P
s≤n
¡n
s
¢
(1 − ε)sεn−s .
In particular it is easy to see that ¯ P(q0, ¯ q) is decreasing in T, and therefore decreasing in q0 and
increasing in ¯ q, and therefore
Q(q0,w)=1− ¯ P(q0, ¯ q)
is increasing in q0 and decreasing in q and therefore in the minimum wage w. QED.
Thus, when the economy is truly cooperative, the economy is more likely to converge toward
a steady state equilibrium with positive union density if initial beliefs are suﬃciently optimistic
and the minimum wage is suﬃciently low
3.3 Optimal minimum wage and the multiplicity of steady-state social regimes
In this section we analyze the reverse causality from current beliefs about cooperation to the
minimum wage optimally chosen by a utilitarian government. We begin to deﬁne the optimal
minimum wage set by the government in every period. Then, we proceed to analyze the short-run
equilibrium, when the belief about the cooperative nature of labor relations is taken as given.
Finally, we study the dynamics of beliefs unionization and we show that the model generates
multiple (long-term) social regimes.
3.3.1 The ex-ante social welfare function and the optimal minimum wage
It is assumed that the government, contrary to the trade union, does not observe the productivity
of each individual. This assumption is meant to capture in a simple way the fact that trade unions
gather information, thanks to the bargaining process, that is not available to the government.
The cost of unionization can be interpreted as the cost of information obtained by the trade
union.
Since the government does not observe productivity, the minimum wage can only be the
lowest bound of the wage distribution. The election process is represented by a probabilistic
12Here we use the fact that
qt =P r[ e = C|ht(n,s)] =
1
1+(
1−q0
q0 )(
1−ε
ε )n−2s.
19voting model which implies, under some assumptions assumed to be fulﬁlled, that the elected
government maximizes the sum of the utilities of the workers.13
Given qt, the government chooses the minimum wage ¯ wt =¯ w(qt) ≥ 0 that maximizes the
social welfare function equal to the sum of the gains of the workers minus the investment costs:
Wt =
∙
G
µ
c ¯ wt
μ(1 − c)p(qt)
¶
− G(¯ wt)
¸
¯ wt+
Z 1
c ¯ wt
μ(1−c)p(qt,it)
(1 − c){p(qt)w(y)+[ 1− p(qt)] ¯ wt}dG(y) (7)
where p(qt) is given by
p(qt)=ε +( 1− 2ε)qt.
When c ¯ wt
μ(1−c)p(qt) is greater than 1, then social welfare is equal to:
Wt =[ 1− G(¯ wt)] ¯ wt. (8)
Maximizing welfare over the choice of minimum wage wt, we can establish the following
Proposition 2: The optimal minimum wage w(qt) at date t is equal to:
¯ w(qt)=
(
p(qt)μ(1−c)2
2μ(1−c)p(qt)−c2 if p(qt) ≥ c
2μ(1−c)
1/2 if p(qt) ≤ c
2μ(1−c).
(9)
Proof:C o n s i d e rﬁrst the case when the welfare maximization program has an interior solution
¯ wt > 0 such that
c ¯ wt
μ(1 − c)p(qt)
< 1.
Then the optimal minimum wage satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition:
∂Wt
∂ ¯ wt
=0 , or equivalently: ¯ wt =
p(qt)μ(1 − c)2
2μ(1 − c)p(qt) − c2. (10)
The solution ¯ wt is truly interior if
c(1 − c)
2μ(1 − c)p(qt) − c2 < 1,
or equivalently
p(qt) >
c
2μ(1 − c)
.
13This outcome can be derived from the simple case in which individuals are heterogeneous with respect to
ideological biases towards the candidates. Then, following Persson and Tabellini (2000) it turns out that the
outcome of the elections maximizes the utilitarian criterion if the ideological bias is represented by an additive
term in the utility function and is distributed with a uniform distribution independent of the distribution of
productivities.
20Now suppose that
p(qt) ≤
c
2μ(1 − c)
,
then the optimal minimum wage ¯ wt maximizes
Wt =[ 1− G(¯ wt)] ¯ wt.
Note that in this case
∂Wt
∂ ¯ wt
=1− 2¯ wt,
which is positive if ¯ wt < 1/2 and negative otherwise. Thus in this case the optimal minimum
wage is simply
¯ wt =
1
2
,
which establishes the proposition. QED.
3.3.2 Short run equilibrium, for given current beliefs about cooperation
We now proceed by backward induction. Consider ﬁrst the government’s choice of minimum
wage for given beliefs qt. Proposition 2 gives us the answer, namely, the government will choose
¯ w(qt)=
(
[ε+(1−2ε)qt]μ(1−c)2
2μ(1−c)[ε+(1−2ε)qt]−c2 if ε +( 1− 2ε)qt ≥ c
2μ(1−c)
1/2 otherwise,
(11)
which is decreasing in qt since c<1.
Let ˜ q be deﬁned by
˜ q = p−1(
c ¯ w(˜ q)
μ(1 − c)
).
Then, either qt < ˜ q, in which case no worker unionizes and therefore the government sets
minimum wage ¯ wt =1 /2, or qt > ˜ q in which case the government sets
¯ wt =
[ε +( 1− 2ε)qt]μ(1 − c)2
2μ(1 − c)[ε +( 1− 2ε)qt] − c2 < 1/2,
and workers experiments at date t. Since the minimum wage is lower in the second case, union
density is positive in that case.
3.3.3 Comparative static results
Using Proposition 2 and plugging the equilibrium value of the minimum wage back into the
expressions for welfare, employment and output, we can establish interesting comparative static
results on how these three measures of aggregate performance vary with workers’ belief on the
type of the economy.
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Result 2: Employment and aggregate output are non-decreasing with the previous period’s belief
in the cooperative nature of the economy.
Proof: Note that aggregate employment is simply given by
Et =
(
1 − G(¯ wt)=
μp(qt)(1−c2)−c2
2μp(qt)(1−c)−c2 if p(qt) ≥ c
2μ(1−c)
1
2 otherwise.
Thus Et is non-decreasing in p(qt) and thus in p(qt−1) a c c o r d i n gt oL e m m a1a n dt oC o r o l l a r y
1. Similarly, aggregate output
Yt =
Z 1
¯ wt
ydG(y)
is non-decreasing in p(qt−1) since ¯ wt is non-increasing in p(qt−1).Q E D .
When many workers were unionized in the previous generation, the government can set a
low minimum wage because current expected gains of unionization are high. This situation,
which is favorable to employment and output, is also good for aggregate welfare which is equal
to total wages net of total unionization costs if the true nature of the economy is cooperative:
Result 3: When the economy is type-C, aggregate workers’ welfare is non-decreasing with the
previous generation’s belief.
Proof: Past belief has no impact on current welfare if qt is such that there is unionization in
the current period, i.e. if qt ≤ ˜ q. Let us now suppose that qt > ˜ q and that there is an equilibrium
with positive union density in period t. Then, using the envelop theorem the derivative of Wt
(deﬁned equation (7)) at the optimal value of ¯ wt reads
dWt
dp(qt)
=
( R 1
c ¯ wt
μ(1−c)p(qt)
(1 − c)μydG(y) > 0 if p(qt) ≥ c
2μ(1−c)
0 otherwise.
Since from Lemma 1 p(qt) increases with p(qt−1) when union density is positive, Wt also increases
with p(qt−1) if p(qt) ≥ 2c. QED.
Thus, when the true nature of the economy is cooperative, more optimistic past beliefs about
the cooperative nature of the economy, favor current involvement in collective action, and leads
to higher social welfare because the action of trade unions is more eﬃcient than the minimum
wage to ﬁght against the monopsony power of employers.
3.3.4 Dynamics of beliefs and minimum wage regulations and steady-state equi-
libria
This section analyzes the joint dynamics of beliefs and minimum wages regulation implied by
the two-sided causal interaction between the two. We are particularly interested in the existence
22of multiplicity of steady-state equilibria: low minimum wage and high unionization (a “Scandi-
navian” equilibrium) and equilibria with low unionization and high minimum wage (“French”
equilibrium).
“French” equilibrium
When initial beliefs about the nature of the economy, q0 =P r t=0 (e = C), are pessimistic,
the economy can be stuck in a situation with low unionization. This occurs for sure if q0 ≤ ˜ q.
This situation persists over time since the absence of experimentation in period t =0prevents
the updating of beliefs in period 1, and then in the subsequent periods 2,..,∞. The minimum
wage remains high, equal to
¯ w =1 /2,
and union density is equal to 0.
“Scandinavian” equilibria
When initial beliefs are suﬃciently optimistic, i.e. when q0 > ˜ q, union density in period
zero is positive. Then, social experimentation takes place. From our analysis in the previous
subsection, we know that with ex-ante probability
¯ P(q0, ˜ q)=
P
n≥0
P
s≤
n−T(q0,˜ q)
2
¡n
s
¢
(1 − ε)sεn−s
P
n≥0
P
s≤n
¡n
s
¢
(1 − ε)sεn−s ,
the economy will end up in a “French” trap, but with probability
£
1 − ¯ P(q0, ˜ q)
¤
it will converge
toward the “Scandinavian” steady state.
If the economy reaches the “Scandinavian” steady state, the economy had to be of a coop-
erative type (otherwise, the economy could not have converged toward this steady state by the
Continuous Mapping Theorem). The probability of success of voice is then equal to 1 − ε. The
minimum wage and the trade union density are consequently given by
¯ w∗ =
(1 − ε)μ(1 − c)2
2μ(1 − c)(1 − ε) − c2 <
1
2
,π∗ =
2μ(1 − c)(1 − ε) − c
2μ(1 − c)(1 − ε) − c2 > 0.
Welfare comparison
Consider a type-C economy so that the steady state with positive union density can be
reached when the initial beliefs satisfy q0 > ˜ q. Then, we know from Result 2 that aggregate
welfare is increasing with p(qt).S i n c e p(qt) is higher in the equilibrium with positive union
density than in the equilibrium with zero union density, aggregate welfare is higher in the
“Scandinavian” steady state equilibrium than in a “French” equilibrium.
23The following proposition summarizes the above discussion:
Proposition 3: Assume a type-C economy. Then, there exists a steady state equilibrium
with high unionization rate and low minimum wage. There also exist steady state equilibria
with low union density and high minimum wage. In the steady state with positive union density,
welfare is higher than in the steady-state with zero union density.
If initial beliefs q0 that the environment is cooperative are lower than ˜ q, the economy is stuck
in a bad equilibrium with higher minimum wage ¯ wt =1 /2 a n dn ou n i o n i z a t i o n .
If q0 > ˜ q, the economy converges towards the equilibrium with positive union density, lower
minimum wage ¯ w∗ =
(1−ε)μ(1−c)2
2μ(1−c)(1−ε)−c2,with probability 1 − ¯ P(q0, ˜ q) that increases with q0.
In short, a high current minimum wage policy favors convergence towards the “low” equilib-
rium with low beliefs in cooperation and high minimum wage regulation, as it deters experimen-
tation and thereby leads to future minimum wage increases. Our model thus explains why the
stringency of government regulation of minimum wages is strongly negatively correlated with
union density and with the quality of labor relations in cross-country regressions. Moreover, it
accounts for the fact that beliefs about the quality of labor relations are shaped by past beliefs
and past minimum wage regulations. And it predicts that there should be more demand for
state regulation of minimum wages when people believe that the quality of labor relations is low.
The model also explains the potential persistent eﬀects of historical accidents: some failures in
voice can lead to pessimistic beliefs that stuck the economy in the “French equilibrium” with
low union density and no attempt to improve labor relations. Thus the predictions of this model
are fully consistent with the evidence provided in Section 2.
4C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have analyzed how the dynamics of beliefs and state regulations depends
upon initial beliefs and initial regulations. In particular, we have characterized the probability
that the economy will converge to the good steady-state with high beliefs in cooperation and
low minimum wage regulations, as a function of initial beliefs and regulations. We showed the
existence of two steady state equilibria: ﬁrst, a good equilibrium corresponding to countries with
highly cooperative labor relations and low minimum wage regulations. In such countries, there
is no need for a strong legal minimum wage because social partners negotiate wages directly.
Second, a bad steady-state equilibrium corresponding to countries with strong state regulation of
the minimum wage, low incentives for social dialogue and low union density. In these countries,
strong state regulation of the minimum wage crowds out social experimentation and learning
about cooperation. This crowding out eﬀect progressively undermines cooperation and leads
24economies towards steady-state equilibria with bad labor relations and high minimum wage
regulations.
This in turn suggests that state regulation of the minimum wage can have long run costs
that have been largely disregarded by the economic literature so far. The contrast between
Scandinavian countries, which display good labor relations and good labor market performance
on the one hand, and Mediterranean countries with poor labor relations and poor labor market
performance on the other hand, suggests that such costs might actually be large.
This analysis raises the broader question of the possibility for countries to export (well-
functioning) social models to other countries. Decision makers or policy advisers often come up
with a simple answer to this question: namely, that if some institution works well in country A,
then it should automatically do well in country B and therefore be exported to that country in
a ready-made fashion. Thus for example, based on the positive deregulation experiences in the
US and the UK in the 1980s, western leaders and IFIs have pushed for outright deregulation
in all other countries (the famous Washington Consensus). However, this approach misses at
least two important considerations which emerge from the above analysis. First, institutional
change induces an evolution in people’s beliefs in the target country, which in turn will induce
further changes in local institutions over time. Thus, moving towards more stringent and non-
ﬂexible minimum wage regulations may reduce workers’ beliefs in labor cooperation and thereby
increase further demand for labor regulation. Second, depending upon initial beliefs in the target
country, this dynamic process may or may not converge towards the desired outcome. Thus in
our analysis the same minimum wage regulation will result in a lower probability of converging
to the good equilibrium, the more pessimistic workers’ initial beliefs in cooperation. But then,
moving beyond the particular case of the labor market, this implies that when deciding whether
or how to export institutions to other countries, decision makers should look at the resulting
dynamics of beliefs and institutions.
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Cooperative Labor Relations: Executives
R²=0.48
Figure 1: Correlation between State regulation of minimum wages and Executives’ beliefs in
Cooperative labor relations. Source: ILO and OECD 1980-2003, and GRC 1999.
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Figure 2: Legal statutory minimum wages or the degree of extension of negotiated wage ﬂoors.
Period: 1980-2003.
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Figure 3: Degree of dispersion in wage ﬂoors by ages, qualiﬁcations, regions, sectors or occupa-
tions. Period 1980-2003.
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Figure 4: Correlation between state regulation of minimum wages and workers’ beliefs in coop-
erative labor relations. Source: ILO, OECD, and ISSP 1999 database.
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Figure 5: Correlation between union density and Executives’ beliefs in cooperative labor rela-
tions. Source: OECD 1980-2003 and GRC 1999 database.
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Figure 6: Correlation between US-immigrants’ distrust in companies and the quality of labor
relationships in the home country. Source: GSS 1977-2006 and GCR 1999.
33Table 1: Quality of labor relations in OECD countries: 2000s. OLS estimates
Dependent variable Quality of labor relation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Union density
2.091***
(.716)
2.140**
(.912)
State regulation
of minimum wages
-3.339***
(.876)
-2.821***
(.827)
Unemployment rate
-7.301*
(3.802)
-12.625**
(4.170)
Replacement rate
.555
(.941)
.422
(.860)
Beneﬁtd u r a t i o n
-.466
(.570)
.235
(.437)
Employment protection
-.098
(.289)
.152
(.259)
Tax wedge
-1.810
(1.682)
-.366
(1.052)
R2 .34 .56 .46 .74
Observations 20 20 20 20
Table 2: Cross-country correlation between state regulation of minimum wage and union density:
OECD countries 1980-2003. OLS.
Dependent variable State regulation of minimum wages
Cross-country
1980, 1990, 2000
(1)
Within country
1980 and 2000
(2)
Within country
1980 and 2000
(2)
Union density
-.518***
(.083)
-1.089***
(.312)
Union density (-1)
-0.528**
(.262)
Country ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes*** Yes***
Time dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
R2 .441 .84 .82
Observations 58 36 36
34Table 3: Impact of history on beliefs in cooperative labor relationships: Ordered probit estimates
on US-immigrants
Distrust companies
(1)
Management and Workers
will always be in conﬂict (2)
Quality of labor relations
in home country - (I)
-.058***
(.013)
-.200***
( .053)
N 18164 836
R2 .081 .082
History of state attitudes towards unions
and social dialogue in home country
(II)
Hostile Reference Reference
Neutral -.049*
( .030)
-.182*
( .102)
Supportive -.099***
( .019)
-.250***
( .098)
N 18164 836
R2 .042 .085
Ordered probit eﬀects with robust standard error GSS : ***:1%, **: 5%, *: 10
Additional controls: gender, age, education, employment status, income category
A.1 Data on minimum wage regulations
The data on minimum wages come from the OECD database and Neumark and Wascher (2004) for the
levels, and from the International Labor Organization (ILO) for the legislation.
• Minimum wage legislations
The legislation diﬀers mainly depending on the existence of a legal statutory minimum wages, and
the dispersion of minimum wages. These distinctions are documented below.
1. Method of setting
We ﬁrst measure the extent to which minimum wages are directly set by law or by collectively agreed
minimum wages negotiated between social partners. Column 2 of table 5 indicates whether wage
ﬂoors are set by statutory rules deﬁned by the law or by collective negotiation. Column 3 of table
5 indicates the coverage of the minimum wage. This coverage is equal to one when the minimum
wage is set by law. However, it can be smaller than one when there is no statutory minimum wage.
In some countries the wage ﬂoor is negotiated at the sectorial level, but it is automatically extended
in other countries. As a matter of fact, the coverage rates of collectively agreed minimum wage
reach 70 percent in Norway, 80 percent in Sweden 81 percent in Denmark while they are equal
35Table 4: Demand for wage regulation by law - Ordered probit estimates on US immigrants
Government should control wages by law
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Conﬁdence in Business
US-immigrants
-.198***
(.062)
Quality of labor relations
in home country - Index GCR
-.117**
(.044)
Contemporaneous wage
regulation in the home country
State regulation of
minimum wage
.387***
(.123)
Union density -.368*
(.202)
History of state attitudes towards
unions and social dialogue
in home country
Hostile Reference
Neutral
-.235***
(.071)
Supportive
-.188**
(.076)
N 1191 1191 1191 1191 1191
R2 .042 .038 .043 .036 .022
Ordered probit eﬀects with robust standard error GSS : ***:1%, **: 5%, *: 10
Additional controls: gender, age, education, employment status, income category
36to 99 percent in Austria and Italy. Eventually, almost all Anglo-Saxon countries have a statutory
minimum wage. The United States recognized a statutory wage ﬂoor in 1938 by the Fair Act while
United Kingdom established a national minimum wage in 1999 after having abolished the system
of Wage Councils in 1993.
Table 5: Method of wage setting. Source: ILO.
Determination Coverage
Australia Statutory, Provincial level 1
Austria Negotiation, National extension .9
Belgium Negotiation, National level 1
Canada Statutory, Federal and provincial levels 1
Denmark Negotiation, Industry level 0.8-0.9
Finland Negotiation, Industry level 0.9
France Statutory, National level 1
Germany Negotiation, National extension 0.9
Greece Statutory, National level 1
Italy Negotiation, National extension 1
Japan Statutory, Prefectures 1
Netherlands Statutory, National 1
Norway Negotiation, Industry level 0.7
Portugal Statutory, National 1
Spain Statutory, National 1
Sweden Negotiation, Industry level 1
Switzerland Negotiation, Industry level 1
Uk Negotiation, industries, Statutory, 1999 1
Usa Statutory, Federal, States 1
2. Variation in wage ﬂoors
Wage ﬂoors can vary in ﬁve main dimensions: age, qualiﬁcation, regions, sectors and occupations.
Tables 6 indicates whether the minimum wage is set at the national level. It shows that most
countries with a statutory minimum wage opt to set a single wage at the national level. Exceptions
are Canada and the United States which sets minimum wages at both the federal and the regional
level. In the United States, some States, mainly in the South, do not implement the Federal law
and others set the minimum wage above the federal ﬂoor. In Canada, each province sets its own
minimum wage, leading to a wide gap in statutory minimum wages. In Japan, the minimum wage
is set at the prefecture level, with some diﬀerent wages for diﬀerent industries in a given prefecture.
Mexico lies in between, the minimum wage being set at the regional level, but with only three
broad regions and a quite narrow gap between diﬀerent regional levels.
37We also report the potential existence of sub-minimum rates for young workers and trainees. Such
sub-minimum rates are quite common in OECD countries since they concern around half of them.
Countries which exclude such provisions are: Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Japan and Mexico.
But signiﬁcant diﬀerences exist among countries authorizing sub-minimum wage provisions. The
ﬁrst diﬀerence lies in the range of ages covered by the provision. Basically provisions would extend
until 24 years old in Sweden or 22 years in Netherlands while such reductions are permitted only
for workers younger than 17 years in France and 18 years in Ireland. The second diﬀerence is the
extent of reductions. United-Kingdom stands as a polar case with no minimum wage for people
younger than 21 years. The Netherlands accepts a reduction up to 40 percent of standard minimum
wage at 17 years old while the wage ﬂoor is set at 80 percent of the standard minim wage in France
or Spain for this age.
Table 6: Variations in wage-setting. Source: ILO.
Variations by: Subminimum (Age limits, % of standard minimum wage)
Australia Industries,Regions, Occupation, Age
Austria Industries, Occupation, Age No
Belgium Age
20:94%, 19: 88%, 18: 82%
17: 76%, <17: 70%
Canada Industries, regions,occupations No
Denmark Industry, Age <18: 40%
Finland Industries, Age, Occupations No
France Age 17: 90%, <17: 80%
Germany Region, Age, Qualiﬁcations Trainees
Greece Age, Marital status, Qualiﬁcations No
Italy Industry, Age Trainees
Japan Industry, Age, Occupation No
Netherlands Age
22: 85%, 21: 72,5%, 20: 61,5%, 19: 52,5%,
18: 45,5%, 17: 39,5%, 16:34,5%, 15: 30%
Norway Industry, age, Occupation No
Portugal Age <18: 75%
Spain Age <18: 89%, suppressed in1998
Sweden Industry,Age, Occupation <24: 89%
Switzerland Industry,Age, Occupation <24: 70%
Uk Industry,Age <21: 0%, Change in 1999
Usa Age, Job tenure No
• Minimum wage levels
38The level of the minimum wages measured by the OECD refers in general to a full-time workers in
the industry. The data for countries without statutory minimum wage ﬂoors correspond to the same
deﬁnition, borrowed from Neumark and Wascher (2004).
Australia
The federal minimum weekly wage divided by the median gross weekly earnings of full-time work-
ers. Prior to 1997, the federal minimum is extrapolated based on Metal Industry Award C14 wages
and National Wage Case decisions. Source: OECD Minimum Wage Database. Method of setting: An
independent Commission (Australian Industrial relations Commission or AIRC) is responsible for setting
the federal minimum wage via an annual Safety Net Review. Although some state-level legislation also
exists, the federal minimum wage is applicable to the majority of Australian workers. Other provisions:
Minimum wages may diﬀer by industry and occupation if the AIRC approves applications to vary mini-
mum award rates from the federal level. There is also a youth subminimum, with rates ranging from 40
percent to 85 percent of the adult minimum depending on age.
Belgium
The minimum monthly wage for workers aged 21 and over divided by the median gross monthly
earnings of full-time workers. Source: OECD Minimum Wage Database. Method of setting: The private-
sector minimum wage (Revenue Minimum Mensuel Moyen Garanti) is set via a biennial national collective
bargaining agreement between social partners (employers and unions) within the Conseil National du
Travail. This minimum wage is then made mandatory for the entire private sector by royal decree.
Between collective bargaining agreements, the minimum wage is indexed to the consumer price index,
with a formula that adjusts up the minimum two months following a cumulative 2 percent increase in
the CPI. Other provisions: The laws provide for a subminimum wage for employees less than 21 years of
age. This subminimum wage is 70 percent of the adult minimum for employees aged 16 or under, with
the proportion rising by 6 percentage points for each extra year of age.
Canada
Weighted average of provincial hourly minimum wage levels (weighted by the size of the labor force
in each province) divided by median gross hourly earnings of full-time workers. Source: OECD Minimum
Wage Database. Method of setting: Minimum wages are set separately in each province and territory
either by minimum wage boards or by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council. Other provisions: In most
provinces, a single minimum wage applies to workers aged 16 and over. An exception is Ontario, which
allows a slightly lower minimum wage rate to be paid to students under 18 years of age.
Denmark
39The average hourly minimum wage divided by an average hourly wage. Source: Dolado, et al. (1996).
Method of setting: There is no legally-mandated national minimum wage. Instead, minimum hourly wage
rates are set via centralized industry-level collective bargaining agreements, which may be supplemented
by agreements at the plant level. Other provisions: Minimum wages may vary considerably at the industry
level. In addition, workers under 18 years of age are generally subject to a lower minimum wage.
Finland
Average monthly minimum wage divided by an average monthly wage. Source: Dolado, et al. (1996).
Method of setting: There is no legislated national minimum wage. Instead, minimum wage rates are set
via centralized industry-level collective bargaining agreements. The law requires all employers (including
non-union employers) to pay the minimum rates contained in these collective bargaining agreements.
Other provisions: Minimum wages may vary considerably at the industry level.
France
Gross annual equivalent of the annual minimum wage divided by median gross annual earnings of
full-time workers in the private and semi-private sector. Source: OECD Minimum Wage Database.
Method of setting: The minimum wage (Salaire Minimum Interprofessional de Croissance, or SMIC) is
set by the government. Administrative procedures are used to adjust the SMIC each July to reﬂect both
consumer price increases and real wage increases in the hourly wages of manual workers. In addition, the
government has sometimes enacted additional increases in the minimum wage. Other provisions: Limited
youth subminimum wage rates are applicable to workers under the age of 18. Speciﬁcally, workers aged
16 can be paid 80 percent of the adult minimum, while workers aged 17 can be paid 90 percent of the
adult minimum for six months.
Germany
Average monthly minimum wage divided by an average monthly wage. Source: Dolado, et al. (1996).
Method of setting: There is no legislated national minimum wage. Instead, minimum wage rates are
set via industry-speciﬁc collective bargaining agreements. These agreements can be extended to all
employers in the industry if the workforce of the employers directly aﬀected by the agreement comprises
at least 50 percent of the total workforce in that industry. In addition, the government may call for a
Hauptausschuβ commission (consisting of the government, employers, and employees) to set minimum
wage levels in industries where unions represent only a minority of employees. Other provisions: Minimum
wages may vary considerably at the industry level. Some industry agreements include youth subminimum
wage rates.
Greece
40Minimum daily wage for an unqualiﬁed single worker with no work experience (converted to an hourly
rate by assuming an 8 hour work day) divided by the mean hourly wage in manufacturing. Source: OECD
Minimum Wage Database. Method of setting: The national minimum wage level is negotiated annually
by representatives of the General Confederation of Greek Workers and the main employer organizations
(facilitated by arbitration if necessary). The negotiated level is routinely ratiﬁed by the Ministry of Labor
and is applicable to all workers. Other provisions: The minimum wage varies slightly by tenure and by
marital status.
Ireland
Minimum gross hourly wage divided by median weekly earnings of full-time employees (converted to
an hourly rate). Source: OECD Minimum Wage Database. Method of setting: The government enacted a
national minimum wage in April 2000. This minimum wage is reviewed annually by the independent Low
Pay Commission, which then recommends an increase for consideration by the government. Prior to that
legislation, statutory minimum wages were set by Joint Labour Committees in a limited number of low-
wage industries. These Labour Committees consisted of equal numbers of representatives of employers
and workers appointed by the Labour Court and a chairman appointed by the Minister for Enterprise,
Trade, and Employment. Other provisions: Under current law, workers under the age of 18 can be paid
70 percent of the adult minimum wage.
Italy
Average minimum monthly wage divided by an average wage. Source: Dolado, et al. (1996). Method
of setting: There is no legislated national minimum wage. Instead, minimum wage rates typically are set
via industry-speciﬁc national collective bargaining agreements, which then are applicable to all workers
in the industry. Other provisions: Minimum wages may vary considerably at the industry level. Some
industry agreements include youth subminimum wage rates. Japan Deﬁnition of minimum wage variable:
Weighted average of prefectural hourly minimum wage levels (weighted by the size of the labor force in
each prefect) divided by median gross monthly earnings (converted to hourly basis using average monthly
hours worked). Source: OECD Minimum Wage Database.
Netherlands
Minimum weekly earnings for persons aged 23 to 64 divided by median gross annual earnings of
full-time employees (divided by 52). Source: OECD Minimum Wage Database. Method of setting: The
minimum wage (Minimumloon) is set by law and is normally updated in January and July of each year
based on the average increase in wages negotiated in the private sector. The government may choose to
suspend or alter the increase if the unemployment rate is above a certain level. Other provisions: The
laws provide for a subminimum wage for employees less than 23 years of age. This subminimum wage
41ranges from 85% of the adult minimum for employees aged 22 to 30 percent for those less than 17.
Norway
Average minimum hourly wage divided by an average wage. Source: Dolado, et al. (1996).
Method of setting: There is no legislated national minimum wage. Instead, minimum wage rates typ-
ically are set via industry-speciﬁc national collective bargaining agreements, which can then be extended
to cover all workers in the industry. Other provisions: Minimum wages may vary considerably at the
industry level.
Portugal
Minimum monthly wage for nonagricultural workers aged 20 and over divided by median gross annual
earnings of full-time workers (divided by 12). Source: OECD Minimum Wage Database. Method of set-
ting: The minimum wage (Salário Minimo Nacional) is set annually by the government after consultation
with the Permanent Commission for Social Cooperation. Other provisions: Under current law, workers
under the age of 18 can be paid 75% of the adult minimum wage. Prior to 1987, workers aged 18 and 19
were also eligible for subminimum wage rates.
Spain
Minimum monthly wage for workers aged 18 and over divided by median gross annual earnings of
full-time workers (divided by 12). Source: OECD Minimum Wage Database. Method of setting: The
minimum wage (Salario Minimo Interprofesional) is set annually by government decree, with the amount
of any increase determined by the Council of Ministers. Other provisions: Under current law, all workers
aged 16 and over are subject to the adult minimum wage. Prior to 1999, workers under the age of 18
could be paid less than the adult minimum wage.
Sweden
The average hourly minimum wage divided by an average hourly wage. Source: Dolado, et al. (1996).
Method of setting: There is no legislated national minimum wage. Instead, minimum wage rates typically
are set via industry-speciﬁc national collective bargaining agreements, which then are applicable to all
workers in the industry. Other provisions: Private sector agreements typically specify separate minimum
wage rates for adult workers (ages 24 and above) and youths.
Switzerland
There is no national minimum wage rate in Switzerland, minimum wage rates are set in: 1) collec-
tive agreements; or 2) standard contracts contrat-types de travail. Collective agreements and standard
contracts may apply nation-wide; or to speciﬁc regions. A standard contract is a decision passed down
by a competent body, following the request of a tripartite commission that establishes certain standards
such as minimum wage rates for a particular sector or occupation. These contracts may be established
42if the sector or occupation concerned is not covered by a collective agreement and the Commission ﬁnds
that wages in that sector are persistently low and exploitative.
United Kingdom
Beginning in 1999, national hourly minimum wage divided by median hourly earnings of full-time
adult employees. Source: OECD Minimum Wage Database. Prior to 1993, the average minimum wage
in Wages Council sectors divided by an average wage. Source: Dolado, et al. (1996). There was no
minimum wage from August 1993 through March 1999. Method of setting: Under current law, minimum
wage levels are reviewed regularly based on recommendations from the independent Low Pay Commission.
Prior to 1993, minimum wages were set in 25 certain industries by Wage Councils, which were originally
set up to protect low-wage workers who were not covered by collective bargaining agreements. Other
provisions: Under current law, workers aged 18 to 21 may be paid about 85 percent of the current adult
minimum wage; workers under age 18 are exempt from the minimum wage. Prior to 1993, minimum
wage rates diﬀered substantially by industry, age, and region. Beginning in 1986, all workers under age
21 were exempt from minimum wage laws.
United States
Federal minimum hourly wage divided by median usual weekly earnings of full-time employees (con-
verted to an hourly rate by assuming a 40 hour full-time workweek). Source: OECD Minimum Wage
Database. Method of setting: The national minimum wage level is set by the government and can only
be updated by legislative action. Other provisions: States have the ability to set a minimum wage above
the federal level. Subminimum wage rates may be paid to selected full-time students and newly-hired
youths (for 90 days).
B Indicators of state regulation of minimum wages
We measure the stringency of state regulation of minimum wages through a composite index. A ﬁrst
component of this index is the stringency of the minimum wage legislation, including the existence of
legal minimum wages and the extent of potential derogations. A second component is the level of the
minimum wage. The overall regulation index is simply the product of these two components.
We document how we measure the stringency of minimum wage legislations. This is captured by two
main indicators: i◦) minwage_legal measures the existence of a legal statutory minimum wage, and if
not, the degree of coverage of the minimum wage set by collective bargaining; 2◦) minwage_dispersion
measures the degree of dispersion in minimum wages across ages, qualiﬁcations, regions, sectors or oc-
cupations. We scale each of these two indicators between zero and one, a higher value indicating more
stringent law enforcement.
43Figure 2 shows the ﬁrst indicator, minwage_legal, which captures the existence of a legal statutory
minimum wage and the extent to which minimum wages negotiated in collective bargaining are extended
to all workers. The indicator minwage_legal equal to 1 if a statutory minimum wage exists, 0.5 if instead
the wage ﬂoor is directly bargained over by unions and then extended, and 0 otherwise. We report the
average value of this indicator for the period 1980-2003. A high degree of cross-country variation shows
up along this dimension. A ﬁrst group of countries, namely Scandinavian countries, do not have any
legal minimum wage, and no legal automatic extension of the negotiated wage ﬂoors. Wage ﬂoors are
determined as part of the collective agreements between unions, and then they apply to workers covered
by these collective agreements only. A similar group of countries, made up of Austria, Germany and
Italy, do not have any legal statutory minimum wages. But legal dispositions stipulate to what extent
the negotiated wage ﬂoors should be extended to all other workers. Lastly, a legal statutory minimum
wage is implemented by most Mediterranean and Anglo-Saxon countries. In the United States, this
tradition dates back at least to the 1938 Fair Act while it is more recent in United Kingdom which
established a legal minimum wage in 1999.
Figure 3 shows the indicator minwage_dispersion which measures the extent of dispersion and dero-
gations in minimum wage setting. Minimum wage can diﬀer by ages, qualiﬁcations, regions, sectors or
occupations. A more constraining minimum wage legislation is one that leaves little room for deroga-
tions and dispersion. We measure this characteristic by constructing two sub-indexes for age dispersion
and other kind of derogations. The sub-indexes are ranked between 0 and 1, a higher score indicating
that the country provides little derogation. The sub-index of dispersion across ages is constructed as
follows. The score is equal to 1 if there is no provision at all for sub-minimum wages. It is equal to 0.5
if derogations are restricted to workers younger than 18 years old or if the derogation is less than half
the oﬃcial minimum wage. And it takes on the value 0 if the derogations can be extended to people
older than 18 years or/and if the sub-minimum wages are lower than half the standard wage ﬂoor. The
sub-index for other derogations equal 0 if the minimum wage is allowed to diﬀer along at least the three
dimensions of regions, sectors and occupations, 0.33 if there are two types of distinctions, 0.67 for one
type of distinction, and 1 if no dispersion at all is allowed. The indicator minwage_dispersion is the
average of these two sub-indexes.
Figure 3 shows a great deal of cross-country heterogeneity in the minwage_dispersion indicator over
the period 1980-2003. Countries like France leaves no scope for derogations based on age, occupation, or
industry. Other countries allow for subminimum wages. Thus, special wage ﬂoors extend up to age 24 in
Sweden and to age 22 years in the Netherlands. The Netherlands accepts a reduction up to 40 percent
of standard minimum wage at 17 years old. Nordic countries let unions negotiate the wage ﬂoor at the
44industry level, without any automatic extension to other parts of the economy.
Henceforth, we measure the stringency of the overall minimum wage legislation using the compos-
ite indicator minwage_legislation, obtained by multiplying the indicator of legal determination of the
minimum wage, minwage_legal, by the indicator of potential dispersion, minwage_dispersion.
C Data on US-immigrants
Table 7 reports the number of observations per country of origin for US-immigrants in the Generalized
Social Survey. Results are reported for the three questions we focus on: i) “Would you say you have a
great deal of conﬁdence, only some conﬁdence, or hardly any conﬁdence at all in companies?”, ii) “There
will always be conﬂict between management and workers because they are really on opposite sides”a n d
iii) “Here are some things the government might do for the economy. Please show which actions you
are in favor of and which you are against: control wages by law?”. We only select country of origins
for which we have more than 10 observations. Table 8 reports the corresponding characteristics of the
US-immigrants for each question.
Table 7: Samples for US-immigrants: GSS database 1977 - 2006
General Social Survey
N
“Distrust
companies”
“Managers and Workers
always in conﬂict”
“State should control
wage by law”
Austria 115 12
Belgium 40
Canada 318 21 30
Denmark 211 12 19
Finland 145
France 556 23 55
Germany 4,724 219 429
Ireland 3,141 128 267
Italy 1,401 61 133
Netherlands 404 18 42
Norway 469 32 53
Portugal 65
Spain 169 27
Sweden 454 14 53
Switzerland 122 14
United Kingdom 4,467 210 413
45Table 8: Descriptive statistics: GSS database 1977-2006
Variable
“Distrust
companies”
“Managers and Workers
always in conﬂict”
“State should control
wage by law”
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
Age 45.56 17.42 45.65 17.95 45.08 17.32
Men .46 .49 .43 .49 .48 .49
Education 12.95 2.91 13.03 2.79 13.37 2.78
Income 9.91 2.74 10.48 2.40 10.54 2.35
Inactive .35 .47 .35 .47 .29 .45
Unemployed .03 .16 .02 .13 .03 .14
Employed .62 .48 .63 .48 .68 .47
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